CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-STATES MAY
NOT IMPOSE CIVIL PENALTIES ON THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF STATE STATUTES PROMULGATED
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY AcT-United States

Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992)
During the last several decades, Congress has responded to
concerns about the deteriorating conditions of the environment
by passing major legislation aimed at preventing further harm.'
2
Chief among these legislative enactments are: the Clean Air Act
(CAA); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 3 (the Clean
Water Act or CWA); the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 19764 (RCRA); and the Comprehensive Environmental
Resource and Liability Act of 19805 (CERCLA). 6 To reduce fuI Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Lotz, FederalFacility Provisionsof FederalEnvironmental Statutes: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for "Requirements" and Fines and Penalties,
31 A.F. L. REV. 7, 7 (1989). The presence of pollutants in the environment
presents a significant health threat to the American public. David W. Goewey, Note,
Assuring FederalFacility Compliance with the RCRA and Other Environmental Statutes: An
Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 513 (1987). Historically, pollution control was treated at local levels. Id. But with the increased technological
complexity of our society, especially the proliferation of toxic chemicals, the problem posed by environmental contaminants is increasingly viewed as national in
scope. Id. To combat this problem, Congress enacted various environmental statutes. Id.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). The Clean Air Act (CAA) was the model on
which later environmental statutes were based. Kenneth M. Murchison, Waivers of
IntergovernmentalImmunity in FederalEnvironmentalStatutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177, 117778 (1976). The CAA utilized a joint federal-state approach to improve air quality.
Id. at 1178. The federal government was responsible for establishing air quality
standards, and the states were responsible for developing plans to achieve these
standards by regulating emissions within their borders. Id.
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992). The underlying goal of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA) was different from
the goal of the CAA, in that the CWA was to entirely eliminate any harmful discharge into navigable waters. Murchison, supra note 2, at 1178 n.9. The CAA was
to achieve acceptable standards of air quality without entirely eliminating
pollutants.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992). The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), which was enacted in 1976, utilizes a "cradle-to-grave"
tracking system which monitors waste from its origination to its ultimate disposition. Nancy E. Milsten, Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws
When the Polluter is the United States Government?, 18 RurGERS L.J. 123, 126 (1986).
There are two categories of waste: hazardous and other solid waste. Id. Hazardous
wastes are either: 1) ignitable; 2) corrosive; 3) reactive; or 4) toxic. Id. Other solid
waste consists of sewage or large materials disposed of in dumps or landfills. Id.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992).
6 Goewey, supra note 1, at 513-14.
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ture contamination and diminish the effects of already existing
pollutants, Congress promulgated the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 7 The EPA, among other duties, develops standards for the control of pollutants, allows the states to implement
regulatory programs consistent with these standards and transfers control of the programs to the individual states.8
As a result of federal noncompliance with pollution control
laws, 9 Congress declared that federal agencies should lead the
battle against environmental pollution.' 0 States encountered
problems in enforcing environmental regulations against the federal government" because the doctrine of sovereign immunity
7 Id. at 513. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in
1970 as an independent agency of the federal executive branch. 61 AM. JUR. 2d
Pollution Control § 7 (1981). See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg.
15623 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.S. § 903 (1980) (creating the EPA). The EPA's
mission was to consolidate the primary anti-pollution activities of the federal government. Id. Its primary responsibilities included developing and enforcing environmental standards, studying and evaluating environmental conditions, and
supporting the states in administering their environmental programs. Id.
8 Milsten, supra note 4, at 124. A partnership approach utilizes the strengths of
the different levels of government. Goewey, supra note 1, at 517. A state government is generally more aware of the needs and concerns of its citizens, the impact
of insufficient contaminant control is felt more directly at the state level, and a state
may have more assets to devote to the problem than the federal government. Id. at
517-18. In contrast, the federal government has greater technical expertise and
can establish uniform minimum standards. Id. at 517. Two conceivable weaknesses
of the partnership approach are the possibility that the states might refrain from
performing their functions in reliance on the federal government and that standards might go unenforced in some states. Id. Another reason for the partnership
approach was that Congress did not want to saddle the EPA with the complete
burden of enforcing anti-pollution statutes. Id. at 513.
9 Commander Charles W. Tucker, J.A.C.G., U.S.N., Compliance by FederalFacilities with State and Local Environmental Regulations, 35 NAVAL L. REV. 87 (1986). For
example, a Senate Report concerning the 1972 Amendments to the CWA acknowledged: "Evidence received in hearings disclosed many incidents of flagrant violations of air and water pollution requirements by Federal facilities and activities."
Committee on Public Works, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1971, S.
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1971) [hereinafter Committe on Public
Works].
10 Id. The Senate Report pronounced that the objective of the Amendment was
to "require every Federal agency with control over any activity or real property, to
provide national leadership in the control of water pollution in such operations."
Id.
S1IElizabeth Cheng, Comment, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties
Against Federal Facilities under RCRA, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 845, 846 (1990). The enforcement problems were compounded by the Department ofJustice's policy not to
initiate suits against federal polluters. Goewey, supra note 1, at 546-47. Further, if
a federal agency, for example the EPA, had instituted a suit against a federal entity,
the Justice Department would have intervened against that agency. Id. at 546. The
Justice Department contended that a suit could not be maintained by one federal
agency against another, because such a suit was nonjusticiable. Id. at 547.
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2
precluded enforcement without the assent of the government.,
The lack of strong judicial enforcement prompted Congress
to equip the major anti-pollution statutes with waivers of sovereign immunity for federal facilities.' 3 Congress also included in
the CWA and the RCRA, provisions enabling citizens 14 to sue the
United States for environmental violations.' 5 The waivers did
not specifically address, however, whether immunity extended to
12 Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976). Sovereign immunity is a judicially-created doctrine which is based on the premise that "activities of the Federal
Government are free from regulation by any state." Id. at 178 (citing Mayo v.
United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819)). See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text for a general discussion of sovereign immunity and the Supreme Court's holding in McCulloch v. Maryland.
13 Goewey, supra note 1, at 539. The CWA's federal facilities section provided in
pertinent part:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the ... Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity ....
The preceding sentence shall apply (A)
to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any
recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting
permits and any other requirement, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise
of any Federal, State or local administrative authority, and (C) to any
process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts or in any other manner .... [T]he United States shall be liable
only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by
a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court.
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
The RCRA stated that the federal government
shall be subject to and comply with all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any
requirement for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive
relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce
such relief) . . . in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any
person is subject to such requirements .... Neither the United States,
nor any agent, employee, or any officer thereof, shall be immune or
exempt from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court
with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief.
42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
14 Under CWA, "citizen" was defined as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 13 6 5 (g) (1988). The RCRA
provided that "any person" may initiate a citizen suit. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
States were included in the definition of person under the RCRA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15) (1988).
15 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 n.5 (1992). The
CWA read in pertinent part:
[any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States . . .) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
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punitive civil
penalties against the United States for past
6
violations.1

Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 17 refused to allow punitive civil penalties to
be imposed against a federal agency pursuant to the CWA or the
RCRA.' 8 The Court recognized, however, that injunctions and
other equitable remedies can be used to prod the federal government into compliance with environmental regulations.' 9
The Department of Energy suit concerned hazardous waste generation at a plant in Fernald, Ohio, owned by the United States
Department of Energy (DOE).2 In March, 1986, the State of
Ohio filed an action in the United States District Court for the
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation ....
The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order ... to apply any appropriate
civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). See infra note 89 for text of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
The RCRA stated in relevant part:
[any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States...) ... who
is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States ... who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment ....
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce the permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order
referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take
such action as may be necessary, or both ....
and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
16 Lotz, supra note 1, at 7-8.
17 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
18 Id. at 1631. The Court could not find a waiver of sovereign immunity explicit
enough to permit imposition of civil penalties against the United States. Id.
19 Id. at 1640.
20 Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). The 1050 acre facility, which processed uranium for
nuclear weapons, was operated by private parties under a management contract.
Id. Although there was no nuclear reactor at the site, these processes discharged
radioactive as well as nonradioactive wastes as byproducts. Id.
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Southern District of Ohio.2 ' Ohio sought civil penalties and
damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Secretary of Energy, for
improper disposal of radioactive substances, and chemical and
radioactive pollution of surface and ground water.2 2 Ohio based
its suit on various federal and state anti-pollution laws and requested that civil penalties be assessed against the defendants. 3
The DOE moved for dismissal, contending that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity protected the agency from such claims. 4
The court denied the DOE's motion, ruling that Congress,
through the RCRA and the CWA, had waived sovereign immunity by allowing states to enforce their environmental statutes
25
and to bring action against federal polluters.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. 2 6 The court found an immunity waiver with respect to punitive penalties assessed by states under the CWA, but
not the RCRA and a waiver under the citizen suit section of the
21 Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio
1988), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
22 Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 761. Ohio also requested similar remedies
against the private contractors who operated the plant. Id.
23 Id. Ohio's original complaint was based on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991; the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; the Ohio Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Act, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01-3734.99 (Anderson 1982); and the Ohio Water Pollution
Control Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 6111.01-6111.99 (Anderson 1977). Id. By
the time the case came to trial, Ohio had withdrawn its claims for injunctive relief,
so only the demands for civil penalties remained. Id. Ohio had either withdrawn or
agreed to a stay of the claims arising under CERCLA, leaving the court to decide
only the claims under the CWA, the RCRA, and the state statutes. Id.
24 Id. at 761-62. As a consequence of this doctrine, "[flederal installations are
subject to state regulation only when and to the extent that Congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous." EPA v. California ex re. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976) (citing Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179
(1976)); see also Lotz, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity); infra text accompanying notes 39-44 (discussing in greater detail sovereign
immunity).
25 Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 765-67. Ohio argued that the RCRA had
waived sovereign immunity to civil penalties under 42 U.S.C. § 6961, which subjected the national government to all process and sanctions otherwise available
under the Act. Id. Ohio also argued that the CWA had made the same waiver
through 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), which has similar provisions. Id. at 765, 767. Additionally, Ohio contended that the RCRA, under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), and the CWA,
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), had allowed civil penalties to be assessed against the
United States. Id. at 763, 765.
26 Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
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RCRA. 2 7 The court, however, did not contemplate the issue of
federal immunity from citizen suits brought pursuant to the
28
CWA.
The United States Supreme Court granted the DOE's request for certiorari 29 to determine the extent of a federal facility's
liability for punitive penalties under the CWA and the RCRA. °
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, employing
various technical statutory analyses to demonstrate that Congress, when enacting the CWA and the RCRA, did not intend to
retroactively waive sovereign immunity with respect to civil penalties for past practices. 3 1 The Court recognized, however, that
states may impose coercive fines to induce present and future
compliance with state statutes enacted under the CWA and the
RCRA schemes.3 2
Historically, courts have not allowed states to mandate federal compliance with state statutes.3 3 In McCulloch v. Maryland,3 4
the seminal case establishing this immunity, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the State of Maryland had no authority to
tax a bank lawfully chartered by the United States. 33 The Chief
Justice opined that the Supremacy Clause 36 elevated the federal
government above the control of state governments and thereby
27 Id. at 1062-63, 1064, 1065. The court reasoned that the plain language of the
Acts permitted civil penalties to be levied against United States agencies. Id. at
1060-65. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's reasoning.
28 Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d at 1062.
29 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991) (mem.).
30 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (1992).
31 Id. at 1640.
32 Id. at 1638.
33 Tucker, supra note 9, at 87-88.
34 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
35 Id. at 425. The Second Bank of the United States was chartered by Congress
in 1816, against severe political opposition, to help with national economic
problems. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES-CoMMENTs-QUEsTIONS 78 (1986). Many people perceived the Bank as mishandling its
mission, and thus it became very unpopular. Id. As a result, several states sought
to keep the Bank from operating within their borders by imposing burdensome
taxes on it. Id.
36 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
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precluded states from manipulating and dissolving the federal
government.3 7 Specifically, the Chief Justice posited that an opposite holding would allow the states to destroy the federal government through taxation.3 8
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity originally
emerged from a tax controversy, courts have not limited its application to the sphere of taxation, 39 but have applied it in other
areas as well. 40 This doctrine is not an absolute protection, however, and courts have recognized exceptions to federal governmental immunity. 4 ' A major exception is the judiciaries'
recognition of Congress's authority to permit state regulation of
federal entities. 4 2 Courts have insisted, however, upon strict interpretation of the language at issue and a showing of Congress's
unambiguous intent to waive immunity before finding the existence of such a waiver.43 While the sovereign immunity doctrine
has survived judicially, statutory enactments have eroded its application in some areas of the law.4 4
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
Id. at 431.
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 682, 700-11 (1976) (discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and its impact on taxation and regulatory issues).
40 Murchison, supra note 2, at 1180-81 & nn. 26, 27 (citing cases demonstrating
the wide range of issues where courts have applied federal sovereign immunity).
See, e.g., Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 247, 270 (1963) (declaring that the
United States Government does not have to pay minimum milk prices established
by state law); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48 (1943) (asserting that
state law cannot give an agricultural inspector the right to inspect federally disbursed fertilizer); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 464 (1931) (permitting the
federal government to dam a navigable waterway despite state law prohibiting the
dam); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1920) (holding that federal employee may operate an automobile without a license while performing his duties).
Not all jurists agree with the scope of the application of sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388-89 (1939)
(Justice Frankfurter espousing the view that the presumption in favor of sovereign
immunity should be reversed when the defendant was a federal agency rather than
the United States itself).
41 See, e.g., Virginia v. Stiff, 144 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (W.D. Va. 1956) (holding
that federal vehicles must comply with reasonable state-mandated weight
restrictions).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 286, 296-97 (1958) (upholding Congress's intent to apply state criminal law to federal enclaves).
43 United States v. N.Y. Rayon Imprinting Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1946).
44 Cheng, supra note 11, at 860. During the last century, Congress has become
increasingly inclined to waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government,
partly because the extent of the harm caused by the government has widened. Id.
For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity for:
[all] civil actions on claims against the United States, for money dam37
38
39
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Over the past several decades uncertainties have developed
regarding the scope of federal supremacy in environmental regulation.45 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) 46 proclaimed a policy for federal cooperation with state
and local governments in ensuring a clean environment.4 7
Congress sought to implement this general policy with specific legislation creating joint federal-state programs designed to
enhance environmental quality. 4 8 Particularly, under the CAA,

the federal government was primarily responsible for the establishment of national standards for environmental contaminants.4 9
The principal role of the states, on the other hand, was the development and enforcement of specific compliance procedures con50
sistent with the national standards.
ages, accruing on and afterJanuary 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States serves as an example of ajudicial application of this
Act. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). In that case, the United
States Government owned land in Washington State over which it permitted a railroad company to operate trains. Id. at 316. The United States Government had
negligently allowed highly inflammable brush, dry grasses, and other materials to
accumulate near the railroad right-of-way. Id. A railroad engine spewed sparks
onto these materials, causing six fires to ignite and spread onto adjoining lands. Id.
Pursuant to an agreement with the State of Washington, the United States Forest
Service had the exclusive duty to fight the fires. Id. The Forest Service, however,
used improper fire-fighting techniques, and the fires became one conflagration
"spreading as much as twenty miles in one direction," destroying buildings, timber
and other property. Id. at 316-17. The Supreme Court held that Congress had
intended to shift the harm caused by federal negligence from the injured party to
the negligent governmental party, even if this represented a large sum of money, as
would be the case if entire communities were incinerated. Id. at 319-20.
45 Tucker, supra note 9, at 88.
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
47 Tucker, supra note 9, at 88. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) enjoined the federal government, ordering the government to:
cooperate with State and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and
measures.., to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
48 Murchison, supra note 2, at 1177-78.
49 Id. at 1178.
50 Id. at 1178-79.
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Congress, recognizing that federal agencies and facilities are
major contributors to environmental problems, sought to include
those federal entities under the regulatory scheme. 5 ' At first this
inclusion was voluntary. 52 Congress became dissatisfied with the
extent of noncompulsory federal compliance, 53 however, and added provisions to the major environmental enactments prescribing mandatory federal observance of the regulations "to the
54
same extent that any person is subject to the requirements.
A question immediately arose concerning the precise meaning of "requirements. 5 5 Federal agencies argued that the term
only included state substantive requirements and not state proce51 See, e.g., Committee on Public Works, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1971, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (stating that federal facility compliance with the CWA was required, citing blatant water and air pollution violations
by federal facilities).
52 Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 171 (1976). The Supreme Court noted:
Before 1970, § 111 (a) of the Clean Air Act simply declared "the intent of Congress" to be that federal installations "shall, to the extent
practicable and consistent with the interests of the United States and
within any available appropriations, cooperate with" federal and state
air pollution control authorities "in preventing and controlling the
pollution of the air in such area."
Id. at 171 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857f(a) (1964 & Supp. V)).
53 Murchison, supra note 2, at 1184-85. The United States Supreme Court, in
Hancock, noted that Congress had concluded that simply "admonishing" federal
entities for failing to cooperate under such voluntary regulations was inadequate.
Hancock, 426 U.S. at 171.
54 Murchison, supra note 2, at 1185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970)). In 1970
Congress added § 118 to the CAA, ordering federal compliance with state and local
air pollution laws equal to the compliance demanded of "any person." Id. Section
118, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f), provided in pertinent part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having
jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity
resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall
comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any
person is subject to such requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 1857(f) (1970).
Also in 1970, Congress amended the CWA to include a virtually identical provision with respect to water pollution, except it stated that federal compliance included "reasonable service charges." Murchison, supra note 2, at 1184 (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. III 1970)).
Recognizing that a total waiver of sovereign immunity might allow states to
dictate the fiscal priorities of the federal government, Congress added a sentence to
each of these amendments, allowing the President to exempt a federal facility from
the regulatory requirements upon a finding that such would be in accord with the
national interest. Goewey, supra note 1, at 523, 525.
55 Murchison, supra note 2, at 1187.
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dural requirements. 56 The judiciary first addressed this issue in
California v. Stastny,57 holding that federal agencies did not have
to comply with state permitting procedures before operating an
apparatus capable of producing air pollution.5
Divergent views among the federal circuit courts soon
arose, 59 prompting the United States Supreme Court response in
the companion cases of Hancock v. Train6 0 and EPA v. Cal. ex rel.
State Water Resources Control Bd. 6 ' In Hancock, the issue was
whether section 118 of the CAA allowed the states to require federal facilities to obtain state permits as a precondition of their
operation.62 The Court could not find from the language of the
statute or its legislative history, an indication of Congressional
intent to condition operation of federal facilities on the acquisition of a permit from a state official. 63 In State Water Resources
Control Bd., the Court applied similar reasoning to the CWA and
suggested that Congress "legislate to make [its] intention mani56 Id. The primary importance of drawing a distinction between substantive and
procedural requirements is that the latter often include, among other things, the
necessity of obtaining a license prior to operating a pollution source. Id.
57 382 F. Supp. 222 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
58 Id. at 224. A United States Naval base at Long Beach, California was planning
to operate equipment which might potentially foul the air. Id. at 223. The State
argued that local regulations required the facility to seek permits before such operation. Id. at 222. In the court's findings of fact, District Judge Gray noted:
To the extent that [the local regulation] requires defendants to apply
for and obtain permits from [the local authorities] prior to the operation or use of the equipment and machines at the naval base in Long
Beach, a federal facility, it is outside the scope of the requirements
imposed upon federal facilities by Section 118 of the Clean Air Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1857(f)).
Id. at 224. This finding was without any authority. Murchison, supra note 2, at 1188.
59 Compare Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F. Supp. 360, 365 (W.D.
Ky. 1973) (holding that § 118 of the CAA did not require federal agencies to comply with state procedural regulations, but only substantive ones), aff'd, 497 F.2d
1172 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), with
Alabama ex rel. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that the distinction between procedural and substantive requirements had no basis and was only a
"semantical red herring"), vacated and remanded, Seeber v. Alabama, 426 U.S. 932
(1976), and California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d
963, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that sovereign immunity with respect to procedural requirements under the CWA was waived), rev'd, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). See also
Murchison, supra note 2, at 1190-97 (discussing the differing courts of appeals
decisions).
60 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
61 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Murchison, supra note 2, at 1197.
62 Hancock, 426 U.S. at 177, 198. See supra note 54 for text and discussion of
§ 118 of the CAA as amended in 1970, the statute amendment at issue in Hancock.
63 Hancock, 426 U.S. at 198.
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fest" if the Court's decision distorted the legislature's design.'
Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the
RCRA in 1976 and amending both the CAA and the CWA within
a year.65 The exact boundaries to which these statutes waived
sovereign immunity were still not clearly defined, however, leaving unanswered the issue of whether, or when, states may impose
fines and penalties on federal agencies. 6 6 In California v. Walters,6 7 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the RCRA
waived sovereign immunity from criminal sanctions under its federal facilities section.6 8
The City of Los Angeles instituted a criminal action in Walters against the Veterans Administration and its Administrator,
Walters, for improper medical waste disposal. 69 The city contended that state criminal sanctions were among the "substantive
or procedural requirements" that could be imposed on the federal government under the RCRA's immunity waivers. 7' The
court proclaimed that criminal sanctions were not a requirement
but rather an enforcement mechanism and thus were not applicable to federal entities. 7 ' The court rejected the city's contention
that Congress, in response to Hancock, intended to include criminal sanctions in the waivers when revising the federal pollution
72
statutes to include a waiver of "all" requirements.
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in United States v. Washington, 73 addressing whether the RCRA federal facilities section
allowed states to impose punitive civil penalties against federal
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 227-28.
65 Tucker, supra note 9, at 91, 92-93. The CWA provided that the federal
government:
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the
same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity
including the payment of reasonable service charges.
64

33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
Lotz, supra note 1, at 14.
751 F.2d 977 (1985) (per curiam).
Tucker, supra note 9, at 97.
69 Walters, 751 F.2d at 978.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 978-79. Not only was such an intent not manifest from the language or
from the legislative history of the statute, stated the court, but probably contradicted by the clear waiver of immunity for injunctive sanctions and the silence regarding criminal sanctions. Id.
73 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989).
66
67
68
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agencies. 4 Judge Alarcon, writing for the court, stated that the
plain language of the RCRA did not connote such an allowance. 75 The court also rejected the argument that Congress, as a
statutory response to Hancock, intended to incorporate civil penalties as part of the procedural requirements.76 Specifically, the
court determined that the statutory language referred to procedural issues of permits, not punitive issues.77 Therefore, the
court concluded, a state may only employ equitable remedies to
compel federal compliance with its hazardous waste disposal
laws.78
In California v. United States Dep't of Navy, the Ninth Circuit
also contemplated whether the CWA's federal facilities section
waived sovereign immunity regarding state imposed civil penalties.7 ° Ultimately, the court held that the CWA authorized only
penalties imposed by the EPA Administrator, not the states.80
74 Id. The State of Washington had attempted to levy $49,000 in administrative
penalties against a Department of Energy nuclear facility pursuant to a state antipollution statute. Id.
75 Id. at 877.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 878-79.
78 Id. at 881. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit utilized similar reasoning in Mitzelfelt v. Dep't of the Air Force, to reach the same conclusion. Mitzelfelt v.
Dep't of the Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990). In that case,
the State of New Mexico attempted to assess a $5000 civil penalty against Cannon
Air Force Base for past infractions of hazardous waste laws. Id. at 1294.
On other occasions, courts have similarly found no waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties under RCRA. See, e.g., Meyer v. United States Coast Guard,
644 F. Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D. N.C. 1986) (stating that a strict interpretation revealed no waiver); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Wienberger,
655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (stating that the "plain face, common sense reading" of the RCRA does not indicate an unequivocal waiver).
79 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988). Section 313 of the CWA mandates compliance
by federal facilities with all state permit requirements authorized by the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). California had such an authorized program embodied in
Chapter 5.5 of the California Water Code §§ 13370-13389 (West Supp. 1982), and
sought to recover penalties from the Navy for its past violations. Dep' of Navy, 845
F.2d at 223. The CWA § 1319(d) provided for civil penalties up to $25,000 per day
for violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
80 Dep't of the Navy, 845 F.2d at 224. The court reasoned that the states were not
given clear authority to impose civil penalties on federal agencies because the CWA
§ 309(a), (b) and (f) authorized enforcement by the Administrator, and because
§ 309(e) suggested that § 309 actions be brought by the Administrator. Id. This
interpretation was further supported by citing legislative history from a House Report stating: "The provisions of section 309 [as amended by § 1319] are supplemental to those of the State and are available to the Administrator in those cases
where... State... enforcement agencies will not or cannot.., enforce the requirements of this Act." Id. (quoting H.R. REPORT No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 115
(1972)).
The court rejected California's argument that it be allowed to seek penalties
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Juxtaposed to the California v. United States Dep't of Navy decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sierra Club v. Lujan,s t
determined that the term "sanctions" in section 1323(a) of the
CWA included civil penalties. 82 The court concluded that the
plain language of the sanctions included penalties8 3 which were
applicable to the federal government because they arose under
federal law, for which sovereign immunity was waived.8 4 Judge
Aldisert, writing for the court, reasoned that the section of the
CWA which specifically allowed civil penalties to be assessed,85
86
also applied to the federal government in citizen suits.
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), which allowed for citizens to sue water polluters. Dep't
of Navy, 845 F.2d at 225. In addition to finding no Congressional intent for citizens
to sue for past violations, the court feared that such a result might frustrate plea
bargaining type negotiations between the federal government and polluters, because after a settlement polluters might still be subject to penalties. Id.
81 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991).
82 Id. at 1426. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Interior, both
federal agencies, jointly owned the Leadville Tunnel in Colorado. Id. at 1422. In
1975, the EPA issued a permit to the Bureau allowing, up to a specified amount,
discharges of pollutants from the tunnel. Id. The EPA required the Bureau to submit a schedule for elimination of these pollutants, but subsequently reissued the
permit for several periods. Id. The Sierra Club and the Colorado Environmental
Coalition filed suit in federal court against the Interior Department and the Bureau
alleging noncompliance with the permit. Id. The plaintiffs sought an injunction
against further violations, civil penalties, and a declaration that the agencies were in
violation of the CWA. Id. The defendants sought to dismiss the civil penalties action, claiming that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity there was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1422-23. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA had
waived sovereign immunity for civil penalties, because 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) made
the federal government liable for process and sanctions, and that sanctions included civil penalties. Id. at 1423.
83 Id. at 1429. The defendants argued that the CWA did not waive sovereign
immunity with respect to civil penalties because "process and sanctions" must be
read as one phrase which included only monetary penalties imposed by a court to
achieve compliance with judicial process. Id. at 1425. The court rejected this argument, declaring that §§ 1323(a) and 1365(a) "contain language that ipsissimis verbis
waives sovereign immunity" for civil penalties. Id.
84 Id. at 1427. The court stated that 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) waived immunity to
civil penalties arising under federal law and that, because the cause of action involved an EPA permit, it arose under federal law. Id.
85 Section 1319 of the CWA provided:
[a] person who violated § 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1325 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing
any such sections in a permit issued ... by a State ... shall be subject
to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
86 Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1427. The question raised was whether the United
States was a person for purposes of § 309(d), now amended as 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
(1988). Id. The CWA general defines a person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988). But because 33 U.S.C.
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The Sixth Circuit confronted similar issues in Ohio v. United
States Dep 't of Energy,a7 where the court concluded that civil penalties were encompassed by the term "sanctions" in section
1323(a). 88 Furthermore, the court drew support from the proposition that Congress had amended the CWA to subject the federal
government to "all" requirements, including sanctions.8 9 Noting
that the CWA waived sovereign immunity only to civil penalties
arising under federal law, the court allowed the State of Ohio to
impose civil penalties by finding that Ohio's statute arose under
federal law.9 °
The court declined to find a general waiver of sovereign immunity under the RCRA, noting that the Act subjected the
United States to sanctions only to enforce injunctive relief.9

When considering the issue of civil penalties in citizen suits, however, the court reached an opposite conclusion and found federal
responsibility for such penalties. 92
Responding to the conflicting courts of appeals decisions,
the United States Supreme Court determined in United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 9" that the United States government

waived sovereign immunity from state-imposed fines for past infractions of the CWA or the RCRA. 94 Justice Souter, writing for
§ 1365(a) provided for citizen suits against any person, including the United States,
the court held that "person," for purposes of citizen suits, including penalties, included the United States. Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1427.
87 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
88 Id. at 1061.
89 Id. at 1061-62 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).
90 Id. The court viewed the Ohio statute as arising under federal law because it
sprang from a joint federal-state legislative scheme. Id.
91 Id. at 1063. The most telling consideration for the court was that Congress
had, in response to Hancock, included in the CWA provisions that subjected federal
facilities to "all requirements" and "sanctions," but had not included the term
"sanctions" in the RCRA. Id. If "requirements" were interpreted to include sanctions, the court noted, then the term sanctions in the CWA were superfluous and
contrary to standard statutory analysis. Id.
92 Id. at 1064-65. The court found Congress's intent evident from the language
of the citizen suit section, which provided "any person may commence a civil action
...against any person (including the United States)" and the district court "shall
have jurisdiction ... to apply any appropriate civil penalties." Id. at 1064 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The court rejected the argument that
since the United States was a person only for purposes of § 6972 and not the Act in
general, and that since "appropriate civil penalties" were provided in § 6928(a) and
(g), that the United States was not a person for purposes of civil penalties. Id. at
1064-65. The court stated that "[slection 6972 incorporates the civil penalty sections, not vice versa... [thus] the definition of 'person' within section 6972 applies,
not the general definition in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15)." Id. at 1065.
93 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
94 Id. at 1631. In resolving the issues, the Court began by explaining the pur-
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the Court, began by expressing the general proposition that
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the national government was shielded from suits absent unequivocal waiver of immunity. 9 5 The Justice stated that such a waiver must be
unambiguous 96 and could be applied only to the extent that the
pose of the statutes involved and their interrelation. Id. at 1631-32, 1634-35. The
Sierra Club court, in a similar case, stated:
The litigants pick and choose parts of a comprehensive statute to sustain their respective positions. Because certain provisions, at least
facially, have the capability of appearing inconsistent, it is necessary to
set forth the statutory provisions in detail. We emphasize that our task
requires correlating and coordinating parts of each provision. Indeed,
in jumping from section to section, we will be fitting together pieces
of a statutory jigsaw puzzle.
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, 1423 (10th Cir. 1991).
95 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584 (1941) (holding that the United States government did not consent to the
suit and therefore could not be sued). In Sherwood, a person named Kaiser had a
contract with the United States for construction of a post office building. Id. at 585.
The government breached its contract, causing damage to Kaiser in the amount of
$14,448.49. Id. at 586. Sherwood, who had a $5567.22 judgment against Kaiser
issued by the New York Supreme Court, sought to enforce this judgment against
the United States. Id. at 585-86. Sherwood relied on § 795 of the New York Civil
Practice Act which allowed for suits by a judgment creditor to be maintained
against a person who owed the judgment debtor money. Id. at 586. The plaintiff
also relied on the Tucker Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(20), which conferred jurisdiction in the district courts "[c]oncurrent with the Court of Claims" to hear suits
against the United States in contract matters to the extent the United States would
be liable to the plaintiff. Id. at 585-87. The Court held that because the Court of
Claims derived its power from the legislature and not the judiciary, it had no jurisdiction over Kaiser. Id. at 587-88. The Court further held that because the statute
conferred concurrent power on the Court of Claims and the district court, the district court had no more jurisdiction than the Court of Claims. Id. at 590-91. The
Court reasoned that if there were no jurisdiction over Kaiser, there could be no
jurisdiction over the United States. Id. at 588. The Court concluded that this action could not be maintained because the United States had not given its express
consent to be sued. Id. at 592.
In Turner v. United States, the Court reached a similar conclusion. Turner v.
United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). In that case, Turner had entered into a contract with the Creek Indians to allow him to construct an eighty mile fence to enclose grazing cattle. Id. at 355-56. The Indians expressed dissatisfaction with the
fence even before construction began. Id. at 356. Despite an injunction issued by a
federal court, the Creek Indians destroyed the structure. Id. Congress enacted
special legislation to enable the Court of Claims to hear the case. Id. at 356-57.
Turner sued the Creek Nation and the United States as its trustee. Id. at 357. The
Supreme Court held that the Creek Nation was not subject to liability without its
consent, and that the United States was improperly joined because it had not consented to the suit. Id. at 359.
Further, only Congress has the authority to waive the sovereign immunity of
the United States. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388 (1939). Additionally, "the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any
state." Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943).
96 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. The Justice relied on United States v. Mitch-
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waiver necessarily followed from the statutory language. 97 According to the Court, the language of a statute waiving sovereign
immunity would be strictly construed to the benefit of the United
States.98
The Court first analyzed the citizen suit section of the CWA
to determine whether that section waived sovereign immunity
and allowed citizens 99 to sue the federal government, seeking
civil penalties.'0° The majority examined Ohio's argument that
the literal language of the CWA subjected federal entities to penalties by providing that the United States was subject to suit and
potentially liable for civil penalties in citizen suits. 0 'l The majority also noted that punitive fines were generally authorized by the
civil penalties provision. 0 2 Nevertheless, the Court rejected
3
0
Ohio's argument.'

According to the majority, the fundamental flaw in Ohio's
proposition was that when the civil penalties section was incorporated into the citizen suit section, its applicability to the federal
government was ambiguous.'0 4 Standard statutory analysis, explained the majority, required inclusion of all the provisions in
the incorporated section, including any qualifications or limitations. 0 5 Applying this principle, the Court noted that the civil
ell, in which the Court stated that "[a] waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be
implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.' " Id. (quoting 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980)).
97 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. The Court quoted Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club
in which the Supreme Court stated that the waiver of immunity cannot be "enlarged... beyond what the language requires." Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983)).
98 Id. at 1633. The Court invoked McMahon v. United States in which the Court
mandated strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity. Id. (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)). Justice Souter stated that any examination of the extent to which Congress intended to waive the immunity of the
federal government from suit under both the CWA and the RCRA must be conducted with these considerations in mind. Id.
99 See id. at 1634. The Court conceded that the state is a "citizen" and "person"
authorized to sue the federal government under the CWA by citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) and (g) (any "citizen" can bring suit under the CWA), and 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(5) (defining person for purposes of CWA to include a state). Id.
100 Id. at 1633-34 n.7.
101 Id. at 1634.

Id. The Court observed that this contention remained undisputed. Id.
Id. at 1634-35.
Id. The Court posited that "[t]he effect of incorporating each statute's civilpenalties section into its respective citizen-suit section is not, however, as clear as
Ohio claims." Id. at 1634.
105 Id. (citing Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926)). The Court in Engel v.
Davenport noted that "[t]he adoption of an earlier statute by reference, makes it as
102

103
104
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penalties provided by the CWA applied to "persons" but the definition of persons did not explicitly encompass the federal government.10 6 Thus, the Court explained that since this narrow
meaning of the word "person" must be adopted, civil penalties
1 7
were not statutorily applicable to the United States.
Justice Souter rejected the argument that because the United
States was specifically subject to suit as a "person" in the citizen
suit provision of the CWA, l08 Congress therefore intended the
United States to also be a "person" when incorporating the civil
penalties section. 0 9 The Court based this rejection on the more
explicit definitions in other sections of the CWA which deviated
from the general definition." 0 Thus, Justice Souter reasoned
that such differences revealed Congress's intent to include the
United States as a person in "clauses [explicitly] subjecting the
United States to suit, but no further.""' The Court utilized parallel reasoning to conclude that RCRA, which involved language
essentially congruent with the CWA, also did not allow for punitive penalties to be assessed against the federal government in
2
citizen-initiated suits.1'

The Court then addressed the extent to which the federal
much a part of the later act as though it had been incorporated at full length."
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926).
106 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-35 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)). For purposes of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) defined "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988). The
Court found dispositive of Congress's intent the absence of statutory language
treating the United States as a person for purposes of the CWA. Dep' of Energy, 112
S.Ct. at 1634-35.
107 Id.
108 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
109 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1635.
110 Id. The Court specified as an example 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(7) defining "person" to exclude some of the governments and agencies mentioned in the definition
of "person" for the Act as a whole in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). Id. Another example
cited was 33 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(8), which excludes "for purposes of this section"
people on board public vessels and the governmental entities mentioned in the
general definition. Id.
I I Id. The majority found that this analysis fit the text of the statute-allowing a
citizen suit against the United States, which could include coercive sanctions, while
not allowing for punitive fines. Id. The Court referred to and agreed with the concession made by the United States Department of Energy that coercive sanctions
may be sought in a citizen suit brought against the United States pursuant to CWA.
Id. at 1635 n.15. It also viewed favorably what it considered to be an implied concession by the DOE of the same issue under RCRA. Id.
112 Id. at 1633-36. Under the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, citizen suits may be
brought by any "person;" and RCRA considers a state to be a "person." Id. at
1634 n. ll (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988))).

1993]

NOTE

779

facilities section of the CWA waived federal sovereign immunity
to the "requirements," including fines, imposed upon federallyoperated facilities under both the CWA and state law regulatory
schemes functioning under the EPA." 5s The State of Ohio contended that the federal government's subjection to state sanctions under the statute included punitive civil penalties." 4 The
Court decided that the State's position, however, was undermined by the state's own definition of sanctions, which implied
that a sanction was intended to only coercively affect prospective
behavior not punish past acts. 115
Justice Souter further strengthened the proposition that
Congress intended the CWA sanctions to be used coercively by
referring to the context in which the word "sanction" appeared."l 6 The Justice commented that each time the word
"sanction" was used, the word was part of the phrase "process
and sanction[s]." ' "1 7 The Justice also noted that the phrase initially appeared as part of a trifurcated statement regarding levels
of governmental authority with which the federal government
must comply: 1) substantive or procedural requirements; 2) administrative authority; and 3) any process or sanction whether or
not enforced by any court." t 8 The Court found the differentia113 Dep't ofEnergy, 112 S. Ct. at 1636.
114 Id. The court referred to 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) which provided that the "Fed-

eral Government ... shall be subject to ...any process and sanction, whether
enforced in Federal, State or local courts." 33 U.S.C. 1323(a) (1988).
115 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1636-37. Ohio had quoted Black's Law Dictionary
which defined "sanction" as a "[p]enalty or other mechanism of enforcement used
to provide incentives for obedience with the law or with rules and regulations.
That part of a law which is designed to secure enforcement by imposing a penalty
for its violation or offering a reward for its observance." Id. at 1636 (quoting
BtAcK's Law DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990)). Ohio had also submitted a definition from Ballantine's Law Dictionary which included in its definition of sanction
that it is a "coercive measure." Id. (quoting BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 1137
(3d ed. 1969)).
The Court gave many examples of this use of the BALLENTINE definition. Dep't
of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1636-37. See, e.g.,
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590
(1947) (noting that "fines and imprisonment are 'coercive sanctions' [imposed] to
compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his duty to do"); Hicks v. Feiock,
485 U.S. 624, 633-34 n.6 (1988) (stating that the " 'sanction' in Penfield was civil
because it was conditional; contemnor could avoid 'sanction' by agreeing to comply
with discovery order"). The Court then referred to caselaw citing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(b) for a list of sanctions that a court could impose to persuade a
noncompliant party to abide by discovery orders. Id. at 1636-37 (citations omitted). For additional caselaw interpreting the term sanction in the coercive sense,
see id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
I18 Id.
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tion between substantive requirements and judicial process significant." 9 The Court concluded that because Congress paired
sanctions with process and not requirements, Congress must
have intended to use the word "sanction" in its coercive sense,
not its punitive sense. 120 The Court reached this conclusion because "requirements" were understood to include both prospective enforcement mechanisms and retrospective punitive
measures.' 2 1 In contrast, the term "process" was generally understood to apply to only prospective enforcement22mechanisms,
which were typically coercive equitable remedies.'
Justice Souter then addressed the CWA section that imposed
liability on the United States "for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or process of such court."' 1 3 The Justice reasoned that
this provision obviously limited the civil penalties available to
state or local courts to coercive sanctions and deemed this readaffirmation of the Court's earlier interpretaing of the statute an
24
tion of sanctions. 1

The Justice had difficulty, however, in interpreting the meaning of the phrase "for those civil penalties arising under Federal
law."' 2 ' The Justice postulated that this phrase appeared to expand the meaning of civil penalties beyond what the Court had
already accepted.' 6 Justice Souter explained that if Congress
had intended to limit civil penalties "arising under federal law"
to coercive sanctions, then Congress would have simply included
these civil penalties in the phrase authorizing state and local enforcement of orders or processes. 127 Such an inclusion would
therefore have made the phrase "arising under federal law" superfluous, a result contrary to statutory interpretation. 128 The
119 Id. The Court also considered it notable that "sanction" was paired with
"process" and not substantive requirements, pointing out that process generally
connotes enforcement provisions used by judicial tribunals to obtain compliance
with orders and decrees. Id. The majority also noted the statute's reference to
sanctions as being enforced by courts. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1637-38 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. The Supreme Court has stated that "[iut is axiomatic that all parts of an
Act 'if at all possible, are to be given effect.' " FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 442 U.S.
255, 261 (1975) (quoting Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S.
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Justice posited, therefore, that the wording of the statute implied
a Congressional intent to expand the meaning of civil penalties
beyond the merely coercive.' 29 The Justice warned, however,
that such an implication created a dilemma as to the federal statutory source for such penalties because there was no foundation
in federal law for these penalties.13 The Justice supported this
contention by noting that the CWA prescribed civil penalties only
in its civil penalties section, 13' which the Court had already determined did not apply to the United States.' 32
The Court next considered whether the phrase "arising
under federal law" could refer to the state regulatory scheme
that supplanted the federal EPA regulations. 133 The Court considered and rejected Ohio's assertion that the common objectives
609, 633 (1973)). In an earlier caseJarecki v. Searle & Co., the Court determined the
applicability of a statutory provision to exempt income from taxes. Jarecki v. Searle
& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 304 (1961). In one section, the statute exempted income
which resulted from "exploration, discovery, or prospecting," while in another section it exempted income "from the sale of patents, formulae, or processes." Id. at
305, 307 (citations omitted). The Court, in rejecting claims that discovery included
the development of a new drug or a new photographic system, postulated that if
discovery were such a broad term, the inclusion of the exemption for the sale of
patents, formulae, and processes would be unnecessary. Id. at 307. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Court, borrowed "the homely metaphor ofJudge Aldrich in
the First Circuit, '[i]f there is a big hole in the fence for the big cat, need there be a
small hole for the small one?' " Id.
129 Dep't of Energy, 112 S.Ct. at 1638.
130 Id.
131 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
132 Dep't of Energy, 112 S.Ct. at 1638.
133 Id. The CWA provided that the states may promulgate their own water pollution control regulations, stating:
The Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may
submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the
program .... The Administrator shall approve each such submitted

program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). Additionally, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c), which provides that
if the state programs comply with certain requirements, then the state program will
supplant the federal program, stated:
Not later than ninety days after the date on which a State has submitted a program (or a revision thereof) pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section, the Administrator shall suspend the issuance of permits
under subsection (a) of this section as to those discharges subject to
such program unless he determines that the state permit program
does not meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section or
does not conform to the guidelines issued under section 1314(i)(2) of
this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988). Section 1342(k) stated that compliance with the state
program would be deemed compliance with the federal program: "Compliance
with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance, for pur-
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and the interrelation of the federal and state plans, coupled with
the state subservience to the federal purpose, supported the in3 4
terpretation of the state system as arising under federal law.1
The Court interpreted the phrase "arising under federal law"
consistent with the Court's earlier interpretation of that phrase in
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which limited federal court jurisdiction to
solely federal claims.' 3 5 Justice Souter said that in the past the
poses of sections 1319 and 1356 of this title [state program] with sections 1311,
1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343 of this title." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1988).
In addition, the introduction to the CWA stated that "[i]t
is the policy of Congress that the States .. .implement the permit programs under sections 1342 and
1344 of this title." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988). Additionally, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)
authorized the EPA to enforce state permits as though they were federal, stating:
(1) Whenever ...the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condition (or limitation which implements section 1311,
1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328 or 1348 of this title) in a permit issued
by the state under an approved permit program under section 1342 or
1344 of this title he shall proceed under his authority in paragraph (3)
of this subsection ....
(3) Whenever... the Administrator finds that any person is in violation ...of any permit condition or limitation implementing any of
such sections in a permit issued under ...this title ...or by a state...
he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such
section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1988).
Ohio established such a water pollution regulatory scheme which subsequently
received federal approval. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058,
1061 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1627 (1992).
134 Dep't of Energy, 112 S.Ct. at 1638. The Court rejected outright Ohio's argument that because, the states can accomplish federal compliance with the Act only
by using punitive measures such penalties are necessary to achieve the purpose of
CWA. Id. The Court expressed its opinion that punitive penalties are not necessary to achieve the purpose of the CWA in ensuring compliance by federal facilities.
Id. The Court reasoned that coercive fines could be just as effective, stating that
"once such fines start running they can be every dollar as onerous as their punitive
counterparts." Id. It is the view of both the EPA and the Department ofJustice that
the EPA may not institute suit against another federal agency, because such a suit
would be nonjusticiable. See Cleanup at FederalFacilities, 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3781,
H. R. 3782, H.R. 3783, H. R. 3784 and H. R. 3785 before the Subcomm. on Transportation,
Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1988) (expressing a similar view).
135 Dep't of Energy, 112 S.Ct. at 1638. "Arising under federal law" has more than
one interpretation. See generallyJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3,
at 16-17 (1985). The term appears in Article III, § 2 of the Federal Constitution:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST., art III, § 2.
The meaning of "arising under federal law" has been understood as allowing
Congress to permit adjudication by federal courts of a case or controversy where
federal law "forms an ingredient." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
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Supreme Court has construed this phrase restrictively, excluding
cases where a state's jurisdiction was explicitly allowed under
federal law but the case was based on state law. 136 Using this
analysis, the Justice posited that the Ohio pollution regulatory
statute provided a right to sue that did not arise under federal
law. 137
The majority then addressed the dilemma created by the
statute prescribing federal liability for civil penalties arising
under federal law when federal law did not create such penalties. 3 8 The majority speculated that this inconsistency was the
result of an intent to encompass future statutory provisions, a
Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). The phrase also appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives
the federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies arising under federal
law: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988). Current interpretation of the phrase, however, has settled that federal law
must be more than just an "ingredient" in a controversy for federal courts to gain
jurisdiction. FRIEDENTHAL et al., supra § 2.3, at 17. In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the statutory phrase 'arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States'
has resisted all attempts to frame a single precise definition for determining which
cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district
courts." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8
(1983). The Court opined that "[t]he most familiar definition of the statutory 'arising under' limitation is Justice Holmes' statement, 'A suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action.' "Id. at 8-9 (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).
Justice Souter adopted this definition for purposes of the present case. See
Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1639 n.16. The Justice observed:
Ohio . . . has offered no reason to believe that Congress intended
[the] broader [Constitutional] reading rather than the narrower statutory reading. Even assuming an equal likelihood for each intent, our
rule requiring a narrow construction of waiver tips the balance in
favor of a narrow reading.
Id. The Justice also posited that because Congress had adopted the same language
in 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), after it was aware of how the Supreme Court interpreted
this language as it appeared in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, that the intent of Congress was
probably to have that narrower interpretation apply. Id. at 1639.
136 Id. at 1638-39. Justice Souter cited Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109
(1936). Id. at 1638. Gully concerned a state tax on a national bank. Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank, 109, 115 (1936). When the Mississippi tax collector brought an action
against the bank for payment of back taxes, the bank argued that the suit arose
under federal law. Id. at 111-12. In denying the argument, the Court held that the
cause of action sprung from a state statute which allowed assessing taxes against
the bank. Id. at 115. Even though the federal statute was necessary to allow the
taxation and therefore the suit, the right to be vindicated was not federal, but state.
Id.
137 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1639.
138 Id. The Court was referring to 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), which allowed for federal
liability for civil penalties arising under federal law. Id.
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possible mistaken belief that such penalties did exist or plain
carelessness.' 39 The majority deemed unnecessary a thorough
examination of the reasons for this wording because two possible
interpretations of such civil penalties existed: coercive and punitive.14 The majority concluded that there was no waiver for punitive penalties because sovereign immunity must be clearly and
unequivocally waived, and, in this instance, immunity was explicitly waived only for the coercive sense of civil penalties not the
punitive sense. 141
The Court then examined the extent to which the RCRA
waived sovereign immunity with respect to punitive fines.' 4 2
Ohio emphasized that because the RCRA stated that the federal
government was subject to all "requirements" of the RCRA, this
statement should serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to the punitive fines allowed under the statute. 143 The
Court found no merit in this proposition, reasoning that a plausible construction of all requirements did not necessarily include
punitive penalties.' 4 4 The Court reiterated the two methods for
enforcing requirements, punitive and coercive, and reasoned that
the congressionally-intended method could be inferred from the
5
4

context. 1

The Court pointed out that the reasonableness of this interpretation was greatly amplified by the "drafters' silence" regarding punitive sanctions in the last sentence of the waiver clause
which "waive[d] immunity from any process or sanction" regardId.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1639-40. The Court agreed with the reasoning expressed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force. Id. The Mitzelfelt
court stated that a "requirement" could include "substantive standards and the
means for implementing those standards, but excluding punitive measures."
Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990). See
also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1921) (stating that even when
Congress mandates compliance by federal facilities with state requirements, explicit
Congressional authorization is still necessary for state imposition of sanctions for
noncompliance).
145 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1640. The Court postulated that congressional
intent to apply only coercive penalties to the federal government could be inferred
for two reasons: 1) all statutory examples of the kinds of requirements meant to
apply to the federal government included either substantive compliance or enforcement mechanisms involving future compliance; and 2) no examples of mechanisms
for enforcing punitive penalties existed. Id.
139
140
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ing injunctive relief. 146 The Court considered it extremely significant that the word "sanction" was specifically referred to as a
7
form of injunctive relief.14

Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
while agreeing that the RCRA did extend sovereign immunity to
federal facilities, presented a thoughtful dissent with respect to
the other issues. 148 Justice White first noted that federal facilities
14
have a low rate of compliance with the CWA and the RCRA, 1
and that this lack of compliance could be expensive for the taxpayers.' 50 TheJustice asserted that Congress, in an effort to alleviate these problems, intended to subject the federal government
to civil penalties in the federal facilities of the CWA and the citizen suit sections of both the CWA and RCRA." 5 ' The dissent
insisted that this intent was clear from the language of the CWA
federal facilities provision which held the federal government liable for "any process or sanction" enforced in any court. 152 The
dissent rejected as "analytic gymnastics" the majority's reasoning
which excluded civil penalties from the ambit of sanctions. 15 3 All
that remained to be resolved, declared Justice White, was which
15 4
civil penalties arose under federal law.
The dissent maintained that both the citizen suit section of
CWA and the Ohio pollution enforcement statute authorized by
the CWA arose under federal law.' 55 Because the CWA allowed
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. The Court reasoned that because there was only one allusion to an enforcement mechanism, that characterized sanction as a coercive way to enforce injunctions, did not necessarily extend a waiver of sovereign immunity from
requirements to punitive fines. Id.
148 Id. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting).
149 Id. Justice White pointed out that federal facilities do not comply with CWA
twice as often as private facilities. Id.
150 Id. at 1640-41 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Cleanup at Federal Facilities: Hearing on H.R. 765 Before the Subcomm. on Transportationand Hazardous Materials on the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989)). TheJustice
cited a Department of Energy estimate that it may cost between $40 and $70 billion
to decontaminate DOE facilities over the next 20 years. Id.
151 Id. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting). The Justice referred to 33 U.S.C. § 1323
and § 1365(a) as specifically waiving federal sovereign immunity from civil penalties under the CWA. Id. Justice White also stated that the RCRA waived federal
sovereign immunity from civil penalties in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). d.
152 Id. The dissent was referring to 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). Id.
153 Id. Buttressing his conclusion, Justice White stated: "[T]he United States
shall be liable for only those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by
a State or local court to enforce an order or process of such court." Id. (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).
154 Id. at 1642 (White, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
146
147
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for suits to be brought against "any person (including . . . the
United States ... )" and allowed for "any appropriate civil penalties," the dissent insisted that this was a clear waiver of sovereign
56
immunity for civil penalties against the federal government.
Justice White rejected the majority's reasoning that the enforcement provisions did not apply to the United States because the
157
word "person" was not redefined from the general definition.
Justice White concluded that Ohio's statute arose under federal law based upon three considerations: 1) the close confederation of the state's regulatory scheme with the federal
government; 2) the fact that the statute's authority was derived
from a federal statute; and 3) because the statute was subject to
federal oversight. 158 The Justice concluded that, in limiting federal liability to penalties arising under federal law, Congress intended to protect against penalties under state laws that had not
been approved by the EPA, not against penalties in EPA ap59
proved sections. 1
Unfortunately, the majority chose to engage in linguistic acrobatics to frustrate the clear intent of the Congress, and to deny
the states a powerful enforcement weapon in the fight against
pollution. Historically, federal facilities have been a significant
contributor to the stream of environmental pollutants. 160 Congress expressed intent in amendments to the CWA and the CAA,
to subject federal agencies to the same requirements under federal, state and local pollution laws as those imposed on other pol156

Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)).

157 Id. The Justice noted that 33 U.S.C. § 1362 calls for application of the gen-

eral definitions "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided." Id. (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1362 (1988)). The Justice considered the direct reference to the United
States as a person to be one of these exceptions which could, in turn, apply to the
"civil penalty enforcement provisions it incorporates." Id.
158 Id. at 1642-43 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White referred to an EPA assertion that "the showing necessary to determine under the CWA whether there is
compliance with any particular state [pollution] standard is itself a matter offederal,
not state, law." Id. at 1643 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioner, OT
1991, No. 90-1266, at 18 n.21).
159 Id. TheJustice asserted that the majority could only "reach a contrary result"
by applying a "restrictive" analysis to the CWA and interpreting the "arising under
the law" phrase. Id.
160 Department of Defense Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Defense of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 430 (1984)
(statement of Josephine S. Cooper, Assistant Administrator for External Affairs,
EPA). For example, "[o]f the 544 major industrial and municipal facilities in significant noncompliance with Water Final Effluent Limits ... 32 or 6% were Federal
facilities .... Of the 523 major RCRA handlers with Class I violations at the beginning of FY [fiscal year] 1984, 30 or 5.75% were Federal facilities." Id.
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luters. 6 ' The United States Supreme Court first attempted to
thwart this Congressional plan in Hancock v. Train, 16 2 by concluding that state requirements to which Congress had subjected federal facilities did not include procedural requirements. 63 Now,
after Congress amended the major pollution enactments in 1977
to overrule the Hancock decision, the Supreme Court once again
elected to obstruct Congress's design by excluding civil penalties
from the states' arsenal of enforcement weaponry.' 64
The citizen suit section of the CWA allows citizens to sue any
person, including the United States, and recover appropriate civil
penalties under the civil penalties section. 165 The majority used
161 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Water Act of 1977, S.REP.
No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1972). The Senate Committee Report on the
1977 CWA Amendments declared:
The Act has been amended to indicate unequivocally that all Federal
facilities and activities are subject to all of the provisions of State and
local pollution laws. Though this was the intent of the Congress in
passing the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,
the Supreme Court, encouraged by the Federal agencies, has misconstrued the original intent.
Id.
Although the Clean Air Act was not under consideration in this case, the Clean
Water Act was amended to conform with its parallel provision in the Clean Air Act.
H.R. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4468. The House Report on the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act
proclaimed:
This amendment is also intended to resolve any question about the
sanctions to which noncomplying Federal agencies, facilities, officers,
employees or agents may be subject. The applicable sanctions are to
be the same for Federal facilities and personnel as for privately owned
pollution sources and for the owners and operators thereof. This
means that Federal facilities and agencies may be subject to injunctive
relief (and criminal and civil contempt citations to enforce any subject
injunction), to civil or criminalpenalties, and to delay compliance penalties.
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1977) (emphasis added).
162 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
163 Id. at 198.
164 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1631 (1992).
165 The citizen suit section of CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), stated:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
13 19 (g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States .. ) .. .The
district Courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (emphasis added). According to § 1319(d), the civil
penalties section, such penalties were not to "exceed $25,000 per day for each violation" and the court had the discretion to consider "the seriousness of the viola-
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convoluted logic to infer that civil penalties do not refer to the
United States because the United States is not a person under the
general definition in the Act. 16 6 Such a textual analysis seems to
67
ignore the clear wording of the statute.
Addressing the federal facilities section of the CWA, 16 1 the
majority deduced that civil penalties were not included in sanctions against the federal government because the word "sanctions" could possibly be used in a sense which does not
necessarily involve civil penalties.' 6 9 This reasoning, particularly
in light of the legislative histories surrounding the various pollution control acts, seems conspicuously flawed. Although a sanction does not always include a civil penalty, it frequently does,
and the phrase "all sanctions" certainly should include civil
70
penalties. 1
The majority failed to reasonably and logically interpret the
phrase "the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law" as it is used in CWA's federal
facilities section.' 7 1 By the majority's deduction, there are no
such civil penalties, and therefore this clause must be superfluous. 172 The majority weakly answered this dilemma with the convenient supposition that
perhaps [Congress] used it just in case some later amendment
might waive the government's immunity from punitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought that liability for
such sanctions had somehow been waived already. Perhaps
someone was careless. The question has no satisfactory
tion or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other
matters as justice may require." 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1988).
166 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-36 & n.ll. The Court referred to the general definitions of person for each act, found in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (in the CWA)
and 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (in the RCRA), neither of which specifically included the
United States. Id. at 1634 & n. 11.
167 Justice White, dissenting, similarly argued: "It is impossible to fathom a clear
statement that the United States may be sued and found liable for civil penalties.
Id. at 1642 (White, J., dissenting) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988)).
168 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). This section subjects the federal government to
all sanctions regarding water pollution control abatement. Id.
169 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1636-37.
170 In this case, the Court explicitly acknowledged the existence of punitive sanctions. Id. at 1639. Once the Court has recognized the reality of punitive sanctions,
and that the Congress has waived immunity for all sanctions, it defies logic to conclude that Congress did not intend to waive immunity for punitive sanctions.
171 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
172 Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
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answer. 1

The majority's assertion that federal compliance can be accomplished with injunctive remedies to the exclusion of punitive penalty
deterrents 74 opposes an intuitive view that frequently this compliance will not occur. 17 5 Because pollution emanating from a federal
facility is just as detrimental as pollution originating elsewhere, civil
penalties should foster the beneficial intent of Congress in cleaning
the environment.
There exists a paucity of evidence that states have abused limited waivers of sovereign immunity for environmental enforcement.
This paucity rebuts the fear that an unlimited waiver of sovereign
immunity would allow states to dictate federal spending, and thus
endanger the federalist approach. In addition, the federal government can litigate penalties improperly assessed and any actions involving the federal government will be heard in federal, not state,
court.' 76 Congress can also amend its laws as required to deal with
any state abuse of the immunity waiver.
Peter McKenna
Id. at 1639.
Id. at 1638.
175 See Cheng, supra note 11, at 864 (explaining the advantages, disadvantages
and varying effectiveness of injunctions and civil penalties). Also, injunctive penalties are imposed only at the end of court proceedings, which may be prolonged,
while civil penalties accrue during the course of the violations, thus providing incentive for earlier compliance. Id.
176 Id. at 867.
173
174

